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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
l'Jature of the Case
Thomas Peterson appeals, contending that the district court erred

it

summarily dismissed his successive petition for post conviction relief without providing
him prior notice of the grounds upon which that dismissal was based

that

Mr. Peterson's claims of relief for ineffective assistance of counsel were procedurally
defaulted because he did not raise them in his initial petition. He also contends that the
district court erred by failing to address his renewed request for counsel, since his
allegations established at least the possibility of a valid claim that trial counsel had
provided ineffective assistance. As such, this Court should

the judgment and

remand this case for further proceedings.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In the underlying criminal case (the second case), Mr. Peterson pied guilty to one
count of violating a no contact order. (R., p.35.) 1 He was sentenced to a unified term of
five years, with three and one-half years fixed. (R., p.35.) That sentence was ordered
to run concurrently with a sentence for a previous violation of that same no contact
order (the first case).

State v. Peterson, 2013 Unpublished Opinion No. 408, *2

(Ct. App. Mar. 19, 2013) (the opinion from Mr. Peterson's subsequent appeal in those
cases, as well as a subsequent case). Mr. Peterson's probation was revoked after he
was bound over and pied guilty to a new charge of violating that same no contact order

In reciting the factual history of this case, it appears that the district court implicitly took
judicial notice of the record in the underlying criminal case. (See R., pp.35-36.) A
motion for this Court to take judicial notice of the documents in its file from the direct
appeal in that case has been filed concurrently with this brief.
1

1

(the third case), since that violation was also alleged as a probation violation in the
first two cases.

Id.

Mr. Peterson filed a motion for leniency pursuant to I.C.R. 35

(hereinafter, Rule 35) in the third case, which the district court denied. (R., pp.35-36.)

He then filed notices of appeal from the orders revoking his probation in the first two
cases and from the order denying his Rule 35 motion in the third case.
Peterson, 2013 Unpublished Opinion No. 408, *3 (Ct. App. Mar. 19, 2013).

State v.

Those

appeals were consolidated. Id.
One of the claims in that appeal was that Mr. Peterson had been deprived of an
adequate record on appeal because an exhibit which the State had submitted during the
preliminary hearing in the third case (which he asserted consisted of documentation of
various telephone and text communication records) had been lost by the district court.
Id. at pp.3-5. The Court of Appeals ultimately concluded that the district court had not

actually considered the documents in question, and therefore, their absence from the
appellate record did not prejudice his direct appeal. Id. at p.5. The Court of Appeals
also affirmed the district court's decisions to impose and execute Mr. Peterson's
sentences. Id. at *7.
While the direct appeals were pending, Mr. Peterson filed a petition for post
conviction relief in the underlying criminal case, in which he challenged his trial
attorney's competence with respect to the plea agreement and negotiations, and also
challenged his sentence as being excessive. (R., p.36.) The district court summarily
dismissed that petition. (R., p.36.)
Thereafter, Mr. Peterson filed a successive petition for post conviction relief.
(R., p.3-4.) In that petition, Mr. Peterson continued to claim that his due process and

2

civil rights had been violated by the district court's failure to maintain an adequate
record. (R., pp.4, 9.) For example, Mr. Peterson alleged that the exhibits introduced at
the preliminary hearing in the third case had been misplaced, which made it impossible
to include them in the appellate record, and therefore, deprived him of his constitutional

right to due process. (R., p.8.) In addition, he contended that trial counsel provided
ineffective assistance for failing to file a motion, as requested by Mr. Peterson, "to
receive court transcripts from the preliminary hearing." (R., pp.4-5.) Mr. Peterson also
moved for the district court to appoint him counsel on the successive petition.
(R., pp:17-18.)
The district court denied the request for counsel and filed a notice of intent to
dismiss the petition. (R., pp.22-26.) The district court gave the following reasons for its
decisions:

(1) the due process and civil rights claims were barred by res judicata

because they were raised in the direct appeal 2 ; (2) Mr. Peterson had provided only a
bare, conclusory allegation in regard to counsel's failure to request the transcript of the
preliminary hearing; and (3) the assertion that counsel failed to request the transcript
does not indicate that counsel failed to investigate some point relevant to the defense.
(R., p.24.) However, the district court provided an exemplar response that Mr. Peterson
might use to clarify his allegations so that they would present a viable claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel. (R., p.25.) It also informed Mr. Peterson, "[a]dditional
information that would be helpful to the Court in determining whether to appoint counsel
on this claim, but which is not required includes: 1) what is Mr. Peterson's

2

Mr. Peterson is not challenging the decision to dismiss the due process and civil rights
claims, insofar as, could and should they have been raised in the direct appeal, they
were.
3

understanding concerning the reason his attorney declined to ask the Court for the
transcript; and 2) was the attorney in question present at the preliminary hearing?"
(R., p.25 (emphasis from original.)

The district court concluded that, "[u]pon timely

receipt of this supplemental affidavit, the Court will reconsider the issue of appointing
counsel and whether the petition should be dismissed." (R., pp.25-26.)
Following the form provided by the district court, Mr. Peterson filed a
supplemental affidavit. (R., pp.32-33.) In that affidavit, he alleged that "this transcript
[of the preliminary hearing in the third case] was to provide the courts with factual
evidence that [the alleged victim] not only initiated contact but manipulated and bribed
me to continue contact even though there was a no contact order." (R., p.32.) He also
alleged that "[t]he transcripts will show prosecution submitted 'phone records' and 'text
message records' as exhibit 'A' of evidence," and that "seeing those transcripts would
[ha]ve persuaded me to request to see the evidence before I accepted a plea offer."
(R., pp.32-33.) He continued, alleging that, upon making the request for the transcript

of that preliminary hearing, "it would have been found that the evidence did not exist,
further knowing there was no such phone records or text messages I would have taken
CR-FE-2011-0003748 to trial." (R., p.33.) As a result, he alleged that would not have
pied guilty in the third case, and therefore, would not have been found in violation of his
probation in the second case (which is the criminal case underlying this successive
petition for post conviction relief). (R., pp.32-33.) He also answered one of the district
court's other questions, alleging that trial counsel was not at the preliminary hearing in
question, and "that is another reason I requested that he ask for the transcripts."
(R., p.33.)

4

However, in the interim between the filing of the district court's notice of intent to
dismiss and Mr. Peterson's supplemental affidavit, the State filed an answer to his
petition. Besides denying all of Mr. Peterson's relevant allegations, the State's answer
asserted that Mr. Peterson's allegations should be barred because they needed to be,
but were not, raised in his initial petition for post conviction relief. (R., p.29.) The State
did not file any other documents, such as a motion for summary dismissal.

(See

generally R.)

Ultimately, the district court recognized Mr. Peterson's timely response to the
notice of intent to dismiss, but dismissed his claim of ineffective assistance because he
had failed to raise it in his initial petition.

(R., pp.39-40.) It also determined, as an

alternative basis for summary dismissal, the facts alleged by Mr. Peterson in his
supplemental petition would not have established a defense, merely mitigation at
sentencing, and that the information was, in fact, argued as mitigation at sentencing.
(R., p.40.)

Furthermore, it found that Mr. Peterson's conclusion - that the exhibit in

question would have been found to be misplaced - was not persuasive on the issue of
whether counsel's performance was deficient, since no one knew that Exhibit A was
missing until the direct appeal was underway.

(R., p.41.)

As such, it decided that

counsel's performance, based on the information known at the time, was reasonable.
(R., p.41.) Therefore, the district court determined that Mr. Peterson had failed to state

a genuine issue of material fact. (R., pp.40-41.) The district court did not reconsider
whether Mr. Peterson had stated a potential issue meriting the appointment of post
conviction counsel. (See generally R., pp.35-42.)

5

a result of

the district court

Mr.
appeal from that judgment.

)
, pp.46-48.)

6

Mr.

a judgment summarily
filed a timely notice of

ISSUES
1.

Whether the district court erroneously summarily dismissed Mr. Peterson's
successive petition without providing him notice of the reason for dismissal and
providing him a meaningful opportunity to respond thereto.

2.

Whether the district court erred by summarily dismissing IVlr. Peterson's petition
without first resolving the question of whether counsel should be appointed and
when his allegations established the possibility of a valid claim.

7

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erroneously Summarily Dismissed ~,1r. Peterson's Successive Petition
Without Providing Him Notice Of The Reason For Dismissal And Providing Him A
Meaningful Opportunity To Respond Thereto
Post-conviction cases are civil in nature. Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 153
(2008). The petitioner in such cases must make more than a short and plain statement
of the claim; he must support his petition by a statement that "'specifically set[s] forth the
grounds upon which the application is based."' Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 674-75
(2010) (quoting Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 249-51 (2009).

The petition also

to be accompanied by admissible evidence in support of the allegations. Id. To
that point, if the petition is verified, it functions as an affidavit, and so, presents evidence
in support of the allegations. Loveland v. State, 141 Idaho 933, 936 (Ct. App. 2005);
Mata v. State, 124 Idaho 588, 593 (Ct. App. 1993).
The district court may summarily dismiss a petition if it "is satisfied, on the basis
of the application, the answer or motion, and the record, that the applicant is not entitled
to post-conviction relief and no purpose would be served by any further proceedings."
I.C. § 19-4906(b ).

However, before the district court may summarily dismiss the

proceedings, particularly if the petition was filed pro se and includes a request for
appointment of counsel, '"[i]t is essential that the petitioner be given adequate notice of
the claimed defects so he has an opportunity to respond and to give the trial court an
adequate basis for deciding the need for counsel based upon the merits of the claims."'
DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho 599, 601 (2009) (quoting Brown v. State, 135 Idaho 676,
679 (2001 ), superseded by statute on other grounds). "Failure to provide such notice

8

and opportunity to be heard may result in the reversal of a summary dismissal of a
petition for post conviction relief." Ridgley, 148 Idaho at 676. Furthermore, "[w]hen the
right [to have claims resolved on their merits] is affected by a defective notice of
proposed dismissal, this Court cannot disregard the error." Griffin v. State, 142 Idaho
438, 442 (Ct. App. 2006) (quoting Baker v. State, 142 Idaho 411, 421 (Ct. App. 2005)).
The reason the district court gave for its decision to summarily dismiss
Mr. Peterson's petition was that the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was
procedurally defaulted, as it had not been raised in his initial petition for relief.
(R., pp.39-40.) The district court recognized that it did not mention that as a justification
in its notice of intent to dismiss. (R., p.39; see generally R., pp.22-26.) In fact, the only
place that justification had been mentioned was in the State's answer to the petition.
(R., p.29; see generally R.) However, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that making
such a claim in the answer to a petition for post conviction relief does not satisfy the
notice requirement.

See Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319, 322 (1995).

Specifically, the Supreme Court held that, "when the state files an answer, as it did
here, the petitioner can rightly expect the matter will go to an evidentiary hearing on the
issues framed by the pleadings, unless the district court provides a twenty-day notice of
intent to dismiss, or the state files a motion for summary disposition." Id. The Court
continued: "Under the circumstances, we do not believe the state's general request in
the Answer's prayer for relief can fairly constitute a 'motion."' Id.
In its answer in that case, the State "denied Saykhamchone's allegations of
ineffective assistance of counsel, and raised various affirmative defenses." See id. at
321. That answer concluded by requesting that the district court "[d]ismiss the Petition

9

Relief in
pursuant

19A901,

entitled action without further hearing
seq." Id. "The State filed no pleadings

than its Answer, and never filed or presented orally a motion for summary disposition of
the application." Id. The State's actions in this case are very similar to the ones it took
in Saykhamchone.

The State denied Mr. Peterson's allegations of ineffective

assistance of counsel and raised various affirmative defenses.

(R., pp.27-29.)

It concluded by requesting that "The Petitioner's claims for post-conviction relief be
denied ... [or] dismissed." (R., p.30.) It did not file any other pleadings, nor did it file or
present any motions for summary disposition. (See generally R.) In such cases, "the
state's prayer for

in the Answer was deficient [to provide notice] for not stating its

grounds with particularity, and for not stating that it was the state's motion for summary
disposition under I.C. § 19-4906(c)." Saykhamachone, 127 Idaho at

(emphasis

from original).
As a result, because the justification for summary dismissal - that the claims
were procedurally defaulted for not being raised in the initial petition - was not included
in the notice of intent to dismiss the petition, and because the claim in the State's
answer was insufficient, Mr. Peterson did not receive the requisite notice and
opportunity to respond to that justification. 3 Therefore, the judgment should be vacated

3

It is possible that Mr. Peterson could, given the meaningful opportunity (particularly if
he were afforded the assistance of counsel), justify why these claims were not
presented in his initial petition. After all, the post conviction statute expressly allows for
claims not raised in an initial petition to be presented in a successive petition, provided
the petitioner can show "sufficient reason [such claim] was not asserted or was
inadequately raised in the original, supplemental, or amended application." I.C. § 19-

4908.

10

and this case remanded so that Mr. Peterson is afforded the requisite notice and
opportunity to respond.

11.
The District Court Erred By Summarily Dismissing Mr. Peterson's Petition Without First
Resolving The Question Of Whether Counsel Should Be Appointed And When His
Allegations Established the Possibility Of A Valid Claim
Even where the appellate courts have found a lack of proper notice, they have, at
times, looked to the merits of the petition to determine if the dismissal was nevertheless
appropriate. See Ridgley, 148 Idaho at 676-77; Baxter v. State, 149 Idaho 859, 865
(Ct App. 2010); but see Saykhamchone, 127 Idaho at 328 ("[B]ecause Saykhachone
was not given proper notice, we also reverse the district court's ruling that
Saykhamchone's application raised no genuine issue of material fact. . . . [l]f
Saykhamchone had been given [the requisite notice), Saykhamchone might have been
able to respond in a way that would raise a genuine issue of material fact.") However,
even if notice had been provided in this case, summary dismissal was still not
appropriate because Mr. Peterson had renewed his request for appointment of counsel
(R., p.33) and the district court did not address that motion before deciding the
substantive question of whether summary dismissal was appropriate. 4 (See generally
R., pp.35-42.) By not resolving the motion for counsel before summarily dismissing the

4

This is particularly concerning in this case, since the district court told Mr. Peterson
that, "[u]pon timely receipt of this supplemental affidavit, the Court will reconsider the
issue of appointing counsel." (R., pp.25-26.) The district court did not make good on
that promise despite the fact that Mr. Peterson timely filed a supplemental affidavit,
which conformed to the district court's stated suggestions for clarification. Furthermore,
the fact that the district court told Mr. Peterson how to respond is indicative of the fact
that Mr. Peterson had raised the possibility of a valid claim, if he presented it in the form
the district court provided.

11

petition, the district court

V.

·140 Idaho 789,

Additionally, assuming that Mr. Peterson is able to make an argument for tolling
the time to file this claim, summary dismissal was also inappropriate in this case
because Mr. Peterson's allegations established the possibility of a valid claim, if not a
genuine issue of material fact, that his attorney provided ineffective assistance of
counsel.

Therefore, he should have, at least, been appointed counsel in this post

conviction case.
The standard a pro se petitioner must meet to justify appointment of counsel is
not as high as the standard

surviving summary dismissal. To merit appointment of

counsel, a petitioner must simply allege facts

raise the possibility of a valid claim.

Id. Pro se petitioners are held to this low standard because the Idaho Supreme Court
has recognized that "petitions and affidavits filed by a pro se petitioner will often be
conclusory and incomplete. Although facts sufficient to state a claim may not be alleged
because they do not exist, they also may not be alleged because the pro se petitioner
simply does not know what are the essential elements of a claim." Id. at 792 (quoting

Brown, 135 Idaho at 679). Therefore, the purpose of appointing post conviction counsel
is to assist the pro se petitioner who has a valid claim, but who may struggle in
presenting all the necessary components of that claim, in arguing a genuine issue of
material fact, and so, survive summary dismissal of a legitimate claim for relief. See id.
After all, it is preferable for claims to be resolved "on the merits rather than on
technicalities."

Carl H. Christensen Family Trust v. Christensen, 133 Idaho 866, 871

(1999).
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In determining whether the petitioner has met this burden, "every inference must
run in the petitioner's favor where the petitioner is unrepresented at the time and cannot
be expected to know how to properly allege the necessary facts." Charboneau, 140
Idaho at 794.

Only if, after running all the inferences in the petitioner's favor, the

pleadings still fail to set forth the possibility of a non-frivolous issue, may the district
court deny the request for counsel. Judd v. State, 148 Idaho 22, 24 (Ct. App. 2009).
To allege facts to make out the possibility of a valid claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, the petitioner must allege facts which demonstrate that counsel's
performance fell below a reasonable standard and that the petitioner was prejudiced by
that deficient performance.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 ( 1984 );

McKeeth v. State, 140 Idaho 847, 850 (2004).

In regard to the second prong of the

Strickland test, a petitioner shows prejudice when he demonstrates that there is a
reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different, or, in other words,
he must undermine confidence in the outcome.
McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 570 (2010).

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694;

In cases where, as here, the petitioner

alleges ineffective assistance relating to his decision to enter a guilty plea, he must
show "'there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have
pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial."' Booth v. State, 151 Idaho
612, 621 (2011) (quoting Ridgley, 148 Idaho at 676 (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S.
52, 59 (1985))).
In this case, Mr. Peterson alleged facts which raised not only the possibility of a
valid claim. An attorney provides objectively unreasonable performance if it is shown
that counsel failed to conduct a reasonable, prompt, and thorough investigation.

13

Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274, 280 (1998). That is particularly true if the petitioner
can show that the "known evidence would lead a reasonable attorney to investigate
further."

Murphy v. State, 143 Idaho 139, 146 (Ct. App. 2006). Mr. Peterson alleged

that he requested trial counsel ask for the transcript of the preliminary hearing from the
related case.

(R., p.5.)

He alleged that investigation of the preliminary hearing

transcripts would "show prosecution submitted 'phone records' and 'text message
records' as exhibit 'A' of evidence," and that, "seeing those transcripts would [ha]ve
persuaded me to request to see the evidence .... " (R., pp.32-33.) He also alleged
that, upon making that investigation, "it would have been found that the evidence did not
exist." (R., p.33.)
Since the State has the burden of proof in criminal cases, a reasonable attorney
would definitely investigate further upon finding that the evidence purportedly supporting
the only charge in the complaint was missing and potentially nonexistent.

The

implication of lost or missing evidence is that the State would be unable to prove
Mr. Peterson guilty at trial, and thus, he would have won an acquittal in the third case.
(See R., pp.31-33.)

By the same token, the State would be unable to prove the

probation violation in this case, and therefore, his probation in this case would not have
been revoked.

Thus, the uncontradicted facts establish that trial counsel did not

investigate that evidence, and so, establish that trial counsel's performance was
objectively unreasonable. Therefore, drawing the inferences in Mr. Peterson's favor, his
allegations establish the possibility of a valid claim that his attorney had provided
ineffective assistance.

14

Mr. Peterson also alleged the possibility of prejudice arising from that deficient
performance, as he asserted that "seeing those transcripts would [ha]ve persuaded me
to request to see the evidence before I accepted a plea offer," and that "knowing there
was no such phone records or text messages I would have taken CR-FE-2011-00037 48
to trail." (R., pp.33.) As a result, he alleged that would not have entered the guilty plea
which was the basis for the revocation of probation in this case. (R., pp.32-33.) That
allegation certainly undermines confidence that Mr. Peterson would have pied guilty
when he did, and so, raises the possibility of prejudice arising from the deficient
performance.
In light of Mr. Peterson's allegations, the district court's alternative reason for
summarily dismissing the petition - that, based on the information available at the time
Mr. Peterson pied guilty, which did not include the fact that Exhibit A was not maintained
as part of the record since that fact was not discovered until the direct appeal was
underway, counsel's performance was reasonable (R., p.41) - does not justify the
decision to not appoint post conviction counsel. The claim Mr. Peterson raised was that
counsel was ineffective for not looking for that additional, relevant information before
advising Mr. Peterson to plead guilty. Therefore, regardless of what facts were known
at the time, there is a possibility that counsel's performance was still deficient because
he did not fulfill his duty to investigate the case.
Therefore, Mr. Peterson alleged the possibility of a valid claim, and should have
been appointed counsel to represent him on his successive petition. As such, this Court
should remand the case for appointment of counsel to assist Mr. Peterson in taking

15

meaningful opportunity to respond

the

summary

CONCLUSION
Mr. Peterson respectfully requests that this Court vacate the judgment summarily
dismissing his successive petition for post conviction relief, and remand this case for
further proceedings following appointment of counsel.
DATED this 15th day of October, 2014.

BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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